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Abstract: The enactment of  anti‐circumvention  laws  in Canada appears  imminent and all  but 
inevitable. This article considers the threats posed by technical protection measures and anti‐
circumvention  laws  to  fair  dealing  and  other  lawful  uses  of  protected  works,  and  so  to  the 
copyright  system more  generally.  The  argument  adopts,  as  its  normative  starting  point,  the 
principle  of  "prescriptive  parallelism"  according  to which  the  traditional  copyright  balance of 
rights  and  exceptions  should  be  preserved  in  the  digital  environment.  Looking  to  the 
experiences of other nations, the article explores potential routes towards reconciling technical 
protection measures with copyright limits, and maintaining a substantive continuity in Canada's 
















This is the pre-peer reviewed version of this article, which is published in final form in the  
Journal of World Intellectual Property (2010) at: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/120125414/issue 
 









Digital  technologies have dramatically  changed  the dynamics of  cultural  exchange  in Canada. 














works,  including  copying,  distribution,  performance  and  display.  TPMs  can 
operate as safeguard or ‘virtual fences’ around digitized content, whether or not 










margins  of  copyright  policy,  of  interest  to  a  limited  number  of  technophiles—or  indeed 
hackers—with  a  working  knowledge  of  circumvention  technologies,  and  a  few  intellectual 
property  lawyers and academics. The issue, however,  is far more sweeping.  In our networked 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society, our culture is digitized; our information, news, research and educational resources and 
entertainment  all  come  to  us  in  digital  packets.  Increasingly,  the  way  in  which  consumers 
access, use and consume digital content is the way in which we, as citizens, explore, experience 
and engage with our cultural environment. When it comes to technical and legal controls over 
intellectual  works,  the  ability  of  the  public  to  actively  and  meaningfully  participate  in  our 
culture is at stake. 
 
This  article  considers  the  impact  of  TPMs  on  content  users  and  the wider  public  interest.  In 
particular,  it  is  concerned with  the  tension between  the  impending  legal  protection of  TPMs 
and the user rights that are part of Canada’s copyright system. TPMs, and the laws that prevent 
their  circumvention,  have  the  capacity  to undermine  the  exceptions  and  limitations  found  in 
traditional copyright law, and thereby disrupt the “copyright balance” that the law is expected 




next  iteration of an amendment  to  the Copyright Act  intended to “respond to  the challenges 
and  opportunities  of  the  digital  age”  (Government  of  Canada,  2008b),  we  have  a  fleeting 




according  to  which  “the  traditional  copyright  balance  of  rights  and  exceptions  should  be 
preserved in the digital environment” (Reichman et al., 2007, p. 1042).  I suggest that the anti‐
circumvention provisions of  the earlier  reform bills did not meet  the demands of prescriptive 
parallelism because they failed to protect the role of fair dealing and copyright exceptions that 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Canada  has  recognized  as  integral  to  the  copyright  system.  Accepting 
(albeit  reluctantly)  the  likelihood  of  new  protections  for  digital  locks  in  Canada’s  revised 
Copyright Act,  this article considers whether and how a substantive continuity  in  the existing 
“copyright balance”  could be achieved.  It may  still  be possible  to  construct  this new  layer of 








role  of  fair  dealing  and  the  public  domain  within  the  Canadian  copyright  system.  It  then 




starts”  in  the  race  to  implement  anti‐circumvention  laws,  identifying  best  practices  and 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proposing some preferred solutions for Canada. The article concludes with a larger cautionary 










across  cultural  and  geographic  boundaries,  and  an  unparalleled  space  for  discursive 
engagement. Viewed in this  light,  it seems almost surprising, and certainly disappointing, that 
the  recent  focus  of  IP  policy‐makers  has  been  predominantly  on  the  threats  rather  than  the 




dialogue over  a  proprietary model  of  cultural  production.  In  the  very  same way,  and  for  the 
very  same  reasons,  that  digital  technologies  promise  to  advance  the  overarching  aims  of 
copyright  policy,  they  threaten  to  undermine  or  unseat  the  underlying  methods  and 
mechanisms of the copyright system.  
 
At  a  more  practical  level,  this  paradox  translates  into  a  digital  dilemma  for  IP  owners  and 
traditional  content providers, which  is manifested  in  their  frequently  reluctant or  ambivalent 
foray into the online environment. While they may indeed stand to benefit from more efficient 
production and distribution of information products, rightholders and industry actors are often 
more  concerned  that  any  such  benefits  will  be  undercut  by  the  increased  threat  of 
reproduction  and  unauthorized  dissemination  that  new  technologies  entail.  Of  course, much 
has been made of the threat posed by the Internet to traditional content  industries and their 
intellectual properties. As individual consumers acquire the ability to circulate perfect, costless 
copies,  the  anxiety  is  well‐founded:  conventional  business  models  are  jeopardized,  existing 
markets  evaporate  and  long‐time  industry  actors  are  effectively  supplanted.  Loss  of  control 




strongly  asserting  their  proprietary  interests  and  employing  TPMs  to  control  the  digital 
distribution  and  use  of  content.  By  providing  a  practical  means  to  ensure  excludability  and 
control, TPMs are viewed by many as the key to ensuring a viable market for digital products 
and  services  in  the  online  environment.  Just  as  the  promises  of  digital  technologies  for 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rightholders are tempered by the threat of uncontrolled reproduction, the promises of digital 
technologies  for  content  users  are  thus  tempered  by  the  threat  of  increased  control  made 
possible by TPMs.  
 
While  owners  develop  and  employ  TPMs  to  protect  content,  however,  users  develop  new 
technologies  to  circumvent  them,  resulting  in what  has  been  described  as  a  technical  “arms 
race”  that  is  destined  never  to  be  won.  Turning  to  the  law,  demands  are  made  for  more 
regulation to support owners’ efforts to maintain control  in the face of the “Internet Threat.” 
The  assumption  is  that  the moving  target  of  perfect  control  can  be  struck  only  through  the 
perfect interplay of technical architecture and legal force.3  
 
It  is  understandable  that  certain  copyright  owners  welcome  TPMs  to  assist  them  in  the 
profitable distribution of digital content—but it is less clear what TPMs have to do with the law 
of copyright as  such. Of course, TPMs can be added  to  the copyright owner’s arsenal against 
unauthorized  users,  complementing  the  rights  granted  by  law.  But  arguably,  technology  and 
intellectual property are best viewed as separate and distinct sources of empowerment, just as 
traditional property and intellectual property law have always been. The scarcity of the physical 
embodiment of a work  (a painting,  say) may contribute  to a  rightholder’s  capacity  to control 
the work’s distribution, but copyright is not concerned with the ownership of the physical thing; 
if  that  painting  is  stolen,  for  example,  copyright  law  is  simply  not  implicated.  Similarly,  the 
application  of  TPMs  to  a  digital  embodiment  of  a  work  may  practically  aid  in  limiting 
distribution of  that work—but traditional copyright  law has no necessary stake  in whether or 
how that TPM is applied or respected. Technical controls enable owners to side‐step some of 
the costs and practicalities associated with the assertion of  legal rights (providing an effective 
second  layer  of  protection),  but  it  does  not  naturally  follow  that  legal  rights  should  be 






been  taken at  the  international  level,  and  consequently,  by domestic  legislatures  around  the 
world.  This  development  traces  back  to  a  1995  US  government  White  Paper  (1995), which 
recommended outlawing technologies whose primary purpose or effect is to bypass TPMs. The 
White  Paper  explained  that,  in  the  digital  environment,  copyright  owners would  increasingly 
turn to technology to protect their rights, but that technology would be found wanting in the 
absence of new  laws  to protect  it.4  The  suggested prohibition on TPM‐circumventing devices 
was thus “intended to assist copyright owners in the protection of their works” (White Paper, p. 
231) and, rationalized in these terms, it was proposed as an amendment to the U.S. Copyright 
Act. While  the White Paper  recommendations stalled  in  the  face of domestic opposition  (see 
Litman, 2001, pp. 122‐9), a draft treaty mirroring its proposals was distributed for consideration 
at the WIPO international diplomatic conference in Geneva in 1996. 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WIPO  negotiations  culminated  in  the  WIPO  Copyright  Treaty  (WCT)  and  the  WIPO 
Performances  and  Phonograms  Treaty  (WPPT).5  The  adopted  treaty  texts  rejected  or  diluted 
some of  the most  highly  protectionist  provisions of  the White  Paper  (Litman,  2001,  pp.  129‐
30),6 including the proposed prohibitions relating to circumvention devices or services. But key 












Article  11  of  the  WCT  leaves  member  states  with  significant  latitude  when  it  comes  to 
implementing the treaty obligation in domestic law. First, the Treaty requires only “adequate” 






measure of  protection  that  a  reasonable person would perceive  as  evidencing  effectiveness” 
(Geist,  2005,  p.  223).  In  this  way,  the  language  of  Article  11  reflects  the  ambivalence  or 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that  are used by authors  in  connection with  the exercise of  their  copyright—and only  to  the 
extent that a TPM is used to restrict unauthorized acts that the law does not permit in relation 
to  their  protected  works.  Simply  put,  the  protection  afforded  to  TPMs  under  the  treaties 
appears  to  coincide  with  the  scope  of  copyright  proper  (Koelman,  2000);  the  treaties  are 
concerned  specifically  with  circumvention  activities  that  facilitate  copyright  infringements 
(Wiese, 2002, p. 150). If TPMs must restrict acts protected by copyright law in order to benefit 
from protection pursuant to Article 11, then it would seem to follow that there is no obligation, 
under  the WCT,  for a member  state  to prohibit  circumvention activities  that do not  result  in 






circumvention  legislation has  emerged  as  a  prominent  component of  the domestic  copyright 
reform  agenda.  As  a  signatory  to  the WIPO  Internet  Treaties,  Canada  is  now  faced with  the 
prospect  of  ratifying  the  treaties  and  bringing  its  laws  into  compliance  with  them.  It  is 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to  copyright  policy  assumes  that  the  restriction  of  the  public’s  use  of  works  through  the 
creation  of  private  rights  can  further  the  public’s  interest  in  the  widespread  creation  and 
distribution  of  works.    The  limits  to  these  private  rights,  defined  by  fair  dealing  and  other 
exceptions—and  circumscribed  by  the  boundaries  of  the  public  domain—are  therefore 
essential to ensure that the copyright system does not inadvertently undermine its own ends.       
 
In  recent  years,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Canada  has  articulated  the  purposes  of  Canadian 
copyright  law,  and  has  acknowledged  the  inherent  tensions  that  these  purposes  present,  as 
well as  the vital  role that  fair dealing and the public domain must play  in alleviating them.  In 
Théberge  v  Galerie  D’Art  du  Petit  Champlain  Inc.  (Théberge),  the  Supreme  Court  identified 
copyright’s purpose as “a balance between promoting the public interest in the encouragement 
and  dissemination  of  works  of  the  arts  and  intellect  and  obtaining  a  just  reward  for  the 
creator.”  The Court went on  to explain,  “[t]he proper balance among  these and other public 
policy objectives lies not only in recognizing the creator's rights but in giving due weight to their 
limited nature.  In crassly economic terms  it would be as  inefficient to overcompensate artists 




ever‐increasing  protection,  and  legislative  reform  looms  large,  these  important 
pronouncements on the nature of the Canadian copyright system have come at a critical time. 
The Théberge decision represented a crucial moment in Canadian copyright policy, cementing a 
vision  of  copyright  as  a  system  intended  not  only  to  protect  the  rights  of  authors  and  their 







dissemination  of  digital  content  is  simple  enough  to  state:  TPMs  do  not—and  generally 
cannot—distinguish between  lawful and unlawful uses and users. There  is no necessary  (and, 
typically, no practical) correlation between the limits imposed on would‐be users by TPMs and 
the  rights  granted  to  copyright  owners  under  the  law;  the  scope  of  protection  afforded  by 
technology just does not map onto the protection afforded by law. While the law attempts to 
achieve  balance  between  owners  and  users  through  careful  circumscription  of  the  copyright 
interest that it creates, technology effectively supplants the law’s solution, usurping its power 
to  effectuate  this  delicate  balance.  The  mismatch  between  technical  control  and  the 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First,  simply  by  blocking  access  to  content,  TPMs  provide  protection  beyond  that  granted  to 
copyright  owners  by  law. Activities  such  as  reading,  listening,  and  viewing  have  always  been 
perfectly  lawful—and of  course desirable  from a  cultural policy perspective—in  the analogue 
world.  Nothing  in  the  law  of  copyright  would  prohibit  someone  from  flipping  through  a 












the  number  (or  even  brand)  of  machines  on  which  content  can  be  played,  the  time  during 
which the content is available and/or the identity of the would‐be listener or viewer. This new 





circumvention  laws,  these  laws effectively establish a  legal  right  to control access  (an “access 









authors  (1999,  p.  5).14  Certainly,  Ginsburg  is  right  to  remind  us  that  the  very  metaphor  of 
balance  signifies  the  need  for  constant  monitoring  and  adjustment  to  maintain  normative 
consistency  in  changing  circumstances.  I would  suggest, however,  that  the  creation of  a new 
“right against the gaining of unauthorized access” does not regain copyright’s equilibrium, but 
tips the balance in favour of owners, to the detriment of users and the public, whose access to 




structure,”  restricting  public  uses  that  have  long  been  viewed  as  acceptable  and  desirable 
(Heide,  2001,  p.  14).  As  Thomas  Heide  warns,  then,  “we  should  recognize  the  very  real 
This is the pre-peer reviewed version of this article, which is published in final form in the  
Journal of World Intellectual Property (2010) at: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/120125414/issue 
 










domain  is  now  subject  to  the  technological  barriers  that  can  prevent  access  to  even  IP‐free 
information resources. An obvious concern here  is  the technical protection of works  in which 
copyright protection has  lapsed. While  the copyright  interest  in a work exists  for a  limited  (if 
long)  period  of  time,  TPMs  can  continue  to  erect  a  barrier  around  works  after  their  legal 
entrance  to  the public domain,  thereby undermining a  crucial  aspect of  copyright policy:  the 
limited duration of private  rights has been a  fundamental  characteristic of  copyright  from  its 
inception, and reflects the “deal” that copyright strikes between the public and the author. To 
grant legal protection over TPMs that protect public domain content is to supplant copyright’s 
time‐limited protection with a  conceivably perpetual  legal  right  to  control access and  restrict 
use of cultural resources.  
 




free  sources,  to  require  members  of  the  public  to  find  and  use  unencrypted  versions  may 
deprive them of the benefits (including accessibility, quality and manipulability) of digitized or 
technologically superior versions. Not only does this argument accept an  impoverished public 





the overall work,  the  ideas,  information,  systems, methods, mergers and unoriginal elements 
within it continue to reside in the public domain (Samuelson, 2003, p. 151). As explained by the 
Supreme Court of Canada,  such  limits on  the author’s  right  leave  room for  the production of 
“new works by building on the  ideas and  information contained  in the works of others”  (CCH 
Canadian Ltd. v Law Society of Upper Canada (CCH), paragraph 23),16 which in turn allows “the 
public  domain  to  flourish”  (CCH,  paragraph  23).  Or,  as  Jessica  Litman  famously  described  it: 
“The public domain should be understood not as the realm of materials that is undeserving of 
protection,  but  as  a  device  that  permits  the  rest  of  the  system  to  work  by  leaving  the  raw 
material  of  authorship  available  for  authors  to  use”  (Litman,  1990,  p.  967).  The  copyright 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in  the  public  domain,  anti‐circumvention  laws  protect  the  right  to  lock‐up  these  resources. 
Technological protection erects  a  fence around  the entirety of  a work without discriminating 





Finally,  the clash between copyright policy and TPMs  reveals  itself  in  the predicament of  fair 
dealing  and  other  copyright  exceptions.17  The  fair  dealing  defence  permits  fair  dealings with 
copyright protected works for the purposes of research or private study, criticism or review, or 
news  reporting  (Copyright  Act,  sections  29‐29.2).18  Acts  undertaken  for  these  purposes  that 
would prima facie constitute infringement, are nonetheless lawful if found to be fair, and if—in 




In order to appreciate the significance of the clash between digital  locks and fair dealing,  it  is 
important  to understand the role  that  fair dealing and other exceptions play  in  the copyright 






Vaver has explained,  ‘User rights are not  just  loopholes. Both owner rights and 




ensure  that  users'  rights  are  not  unduly  constrained”  (CCH,  paragraph  51).21  Against  the 
backdrop  of  copyright’s  public  purpose,  fair  dealing  was  recognized  to  be  integral—not 
exceptional—to  the  system.  Chief  Justice  McLachlin  wrote:  “the  fair  dealing  exception  is 
perhaps  more  properly  understood  as  an  integral  part  of  the  Copyright  Act  than  simply  a 
defence.  Any  act  falling  within  the  fair  dealing  exception  will  not  be  an  infringement  of 
copyright”  (CCH,  paragraph  48).    Put  otherwise,  fair  dealing  does  not  merely  excuse 
infringement,  but  rather  defines  it;  the  owner’s  rights  end  where  the  user’s  rights  begin. 
Following  the CCH  decision,  it  should  be  clear  that,  rather  than  a marginal  exception  to  the 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norms  of  Canadian  copyright  law,  the  fair  dealing  defence  is  an  instantiation  of  the  public‐
author balance; one that is necessary to support the normative claims so often made on behalf 











to prevent  the privileged activity, and the user owes no duty  to refrain  from the activity. But 
conceptualized as a right, fair dealing establishes a corresponding duty on behalf of the owner 










and  as  such,  are  not  capable  of  permitting  individual  access  for  fair  dealing  purposes  or 
permitting fair dealings per se (even in the unlikely event that such a result were sought).  
 
The effect  of  a  TPM  is  thus  to prevent  the  kinds of  activities  that  are  recognized, within  the 
realm of copyright policy, to be deserving of protection from private owner interests, and to be 
central  to  the balance  that  copyright must  strike.  Simply put,  TPMs deny users  the  ability  to 
exercise their rights and thereby tip the balance away from users and the public interest. Here, 
again, it may be argued that a TPM‐free version of a protected work will typically be available 
for  anyone who wishes  to  deal  fairly with  it.  And  so  it  is worth  re‐emphasizing  that,  from  a 







doctrine,  their  efforts  are  increasingly  undercut  by  technological  capabilities  that  leave  such 
deliberations all but moot. Acts permitted in relation to owned content—users’ rights to read, 
listen, research, study, criticize, transform—can be prevented by the use of TPMs, and would be 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effectively  rendered  unlawful  by  proposed  anti‐circumvention  provisions.  To  extend  legal 








traditional  copyright  balance  of  rights  and  exceptions  should  be  preserved  in  the  digital 
environment”  (Reichman et  al.,  2007, p.  1042).  The principle  captures  the general normative 
position that “a technological adaptation, namely, the application of TPMs, should not alter the 
balance  that  existed  under  default  rules  of  copyright  law  with  respect  to  the  enjoyment  of 
exceptions  and  limitations”  (Reichman  et  al.,  2007,  pp.  1041‐2).  The  intuitive  appeal  of  this 
position is quite evident, and nicely captured in the following words of Henning Wiese (2002): 
 
[W]hilst  on  the  one  hand  copyright  holders  will  have  a  justified  interest  in 
regaining  control  over  the  publication/dissemination  of  their  works,  users  will 
have an equal  interest  in retaining  in the digital environment roughly the same 
fair  use  defences.  In  essence,  society  as  a  whole—including  copyright  owners 








2003, p. 38). This  is the challenge that now presents  itself  to policy‐makers and the Canadian 
copyright system: how can copyright’s complicated balancing act continue to be performed in 
any  meaningful  way  when  the  technological  environment  is  increasingly  one  of  absolutes—
absolute freedom versus absolute control? More fundamentally, how can the law maintain its 








openly  take  issue  with  the  foundational  principles  that  underlie  our  existing  institutional 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structures.  In  this  sense,  the  principle  wields  some  political  clout.  It  may  be  that  genuine 
prescriptive parallelism is an unattainable aspiration, but to admit as much is not to undermine 
























As  Litman  argues,  the  significance  of  these  limitations  is  far  greater  in  a  context  where 





copyright reform process make  it “difficult  to prevent  foolish approaches to new technology” 
(Litman, 2001, p. 22). Reforms in response to technological advances are typically fought out by 






wonder  and  panic  at  digital  technologies  and  the  hyperbole  and  hysteria  that  greeted  the 
telegraph,  the  telephone,  the  television,  and  the  photocopier”  (Murray,  2005,  p.  26).  Citing 
Litman, Murray agrees that such historical precedents sound a cautionary note about the swift 
implementation of new laws  in response to new technologies. History reveals that rapid  legal 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responses  risk  becoming  dated  and  “loophole‐ridden”  legal  regimes,  failing  to  reflect  our 
evolving understanding of the new technology and the role that  it will come to occupy in our 
market  place  and  society  (Murray,  2005,  p.  26).  Kerr  and  his  co‐authors  issue  a  similar 
exhortation, urging: 
 
[U]ntil  the market  for  digital  content  and  the  norms  surrounding  the  use  and 
circumvention of  TPMs  (and  their  implications  for  that market)  become better 
known, it is simply premature to try to ascertain what the appropriate practical 
legal  response  should  be….[M]aking  policy  decisions  without  such  knowledge 
could result in great harm to the public interest (Kerr et al., 2002‐2003, p. 76).24  
 
This position  is  consistent with  the general principle of  technological neutrality, which stands 
against  the  implementation  of  technology‐specific  norms  that  are  unlikely  to  maintain  their 
relevance  and  applicability  as  technologies  inevitably  evolve  (Kerr  et  al.,  2002‐2003,  p.  81).25 
Indeed, some argue that the evolution of technology has already rendered the TPM‐protection 
debate  out‐dated.  As  consumers  become  increasingly  cognizant  of,  and  resistant  to,  the 
limitations  imposed by digital  locks and other rights management technologies, the argument 



















the part of  copyright  lawyers  (compare  to Litman, 2001, p. 30)—then  it  seems  reasonable  to 
assert that some degree of legal reform is necessary to respond to technological changes that 
have  rendered  certain  traditional  copyright  assumptions  outmoded.  This  logic  suggests  an 
alternative  route  towards  maintaining  copyright’s  balance  while  also  striving  to  preserve  its 
relevance:  namely,  amending  existing  laws  to  better  regulate  the  use  of  technology  and  the 
digital marketplace in a way that can achieve prescriptive parallelism in practice. 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When  anti‐circumvention  laws  are  rationalized  as  “enhanced  legal  protection  for  copyright 
owners  in  light  of  enhanced  copying  capacity”  (Reichman  et  al.,  2007,  p.  1042),  the  implicit 
assumption is that a further layer of protection is necessary to reinstate copyright’s balance in 
the  face of new technologies.27  In pursuit of  this balance, however, adjustments may also be 
needed  to  the  legal  rights  of  copyright  users  in  light  of  the  availability,  application  and  legal 
protection of TPMs (Wiese, 2002, p. 147). If we accept that, as a matter of substantive principle, 
“the application of TPMs should not alter the balance of rights between copyright owners and 
users,”  then  it  ought  to  follow  that  “all  uses  privileged  under  traditional  copyright  principles 
should continue to be privileged in an era of digital rights management” (Reichman et al., 2007, 
p.  1045).  This  assertion  is  consistent  with  (and  arguably  mandated  by)  the  recognition  of 
exceptions  to  authors’  rights  as  integral  to  the  copyright  system.  As  such,  any  new  digital 
copyright regime that is rationalized in terms of reinstating copyright’s balance in the digital era 
must  offer  a  comprehensive  regulatory  approach—one  that  establishes  a  “symmetric” 
environment  in  which  the  legitimate  interests  of  both  rightholders  and  users  are  protected 
(Bechtold, 2004, p. 363).  
 
Reichman  and  his  co‐authors  argue  that,  if  the  principle  of  prescriptive  parallelism  is  to  be 
respected in the face of TPM protections, “users need a mechanism by which to vindicate their 
rights  and  to  secure  the  certainty  required  to  engage  in  creative  activity  privileged  under 
traditional  copyright  principles”  (Reichman  et  al.,  2007,  p.  1045).  In  pursuit  of  prescriptive 
parallelism  in  Canada,  it  is  suggested  that  any  new  anti‐circumvention  provisions  must  also 
establish a mechanism by which users can vindicate their  rights, exercise their privileges, and 
feel  safe  in  the  knowledge  that  they  will  not  incur  liability  for  doing  so.  Admittedly,  such  a 


















circumvention  provisions  in  this  Act  offer  a  level  of  protection  for  TPMs  significantly  beyond 
that required by the WIPO treaties. The DMCA prohibits the circumvention of TPMs that control 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circumvention measures.  Indeed,  §1201(c)(1)  explicitly  states  that,  “[n]othing  in  this  section 




the  practical  restriction  of  otherwise  lawful  fair  use  activities  in  relation  to  TPM‐protected 
content.  
 
The  DMCA  anti‐circumvention  rules  are  subject  to  a  set  of  seven  narrow  and  hard‐fought 
exceptions30  that  shield  circumvention  activities  from  liability  in  specific  circumstances, 
including,  for  example:  non‐profit  libraries  making  acquisition  decisions  (§1201  (d)); 
governmental  actors  conducting  national  security  activities  (§1201  (e));  and  encryption 
researchers  identifying  vulnerabilities  in  encryption  technologies  (§1201  (g)).31  Litman  has 
rightly accused  these exceptions of being “cast  in prose so crabbed and so encumbered with 
conditions  as  to  be  of  little  use  to  anyone  who  doesn’t  have  a  copyright  lawyer  around  to 
explain which hoops to jump through” (Litman, 2001, p. 31). 
 
In  addition  to  the  specified  exemptions,  the  DMCA  authorizes  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  in 
consultation with the Register of Copyright, to assess the impact of the circumvention ban on 
traditional fair use practices and, if necessary, to issue rules exempting certain users of certain 
categories of works  from  the ban  (§1201  (a)(1)(B)‐(D)).  The 2006  round of  this  triennial  rule‐
making proceeding yielded temporary exemptions for six narrowly defined classes of works.32 
However,  such  exemptions  are  not  permitted  to  extend  to  the  prohibition  on  circumvention 
technologies  (device  controls),  with  the  consequence  that,  “[a]s  a  practical  matter,…any 
exemptions ultimately declared will have very limited utility; self‐evidently, most users will be 
unable to exercise their circumvention rights unless they are provided with the tools to do so” 
(Burk  and  Cohen,  2001,  pp.  49‐50). Moreover,  by  granting  such  power  to  an  administrative 
agency, this procedure has the clear and apparently intended effect of reducing the role of the 
courts and the relevance of fair use in the digital age (see Herman and Gandy Jr., 2006).33 The 
prospective  creation  of  exemptions  based  on  “classes  of  works”  turns  on  its  head  the 





Since  the  enactment  of  the DMCA,  a  number  of  incidents  and  cases  have  revealed  that  this 
apparent threat to fair use activities  is more than hypothetical.34 Perhaps most notable  is the 
case  of Universal  City  Studios  v.  Remeirdes,35  which  concerned  a  software  program,  DeCSS, 
posted online by  the defendant, which  could be used  to  crack  the Content  Scramble  System 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[CSS]  on  commericial  DVDs,  allowing  users  to  copy  and  manipulate  a  DVD’s  content.  In  an 
amicus  brief,  Professors  Benkler  and  Lessig  described  CSS  as  “a  device  that  makes  fair  and 
otherwise  privileged  uses  of  digitized  materials  practically  impossible”  (Benkler  and  Lessig, 
2001).  The defendant  challenged  the  constitutionality  of  the DMCA,  arguing  inter  alia  that  it 
unduly obstructs the “fair use” of copyright materials. The US District Court held that fair use 




CSS protected content.  Indeed,  the Court was not persuaded that CSS prevents  fair uses, not 
least  because  “[f]air  use  has  never  been  held  to  be  a  guarantee  of  access  to  copyrighted 




triennial  rulemaking  proceedings”  under  the  regulatory  powers  granted  to  the  Librarian  of 










 Such  a  limited  exemption  serves  only  to  underscore  the  inadequacies  of  the  rulemaking 







of  circumvention  and  the  trafficking  of  circumvention  devices  and  services,  and  thereby  far 
exceeding the scope of TPM protection demanded by the WIPO treaties.39 The Directive does 
not  contain  built‐in  exceptions  such  as  those  in  the  DMCA,  but  instead  addresses  the 
interaction between TPM protection and user exceptions  in Article 6(4), which states: “in  the 
absence of voluntary measures  taken by  right holders…Member States shall  take appropriate 
measures  to  ensure  that  right  holders  make  available  to  the  beneficiary  of  an  exception  or 
limitation  provided  for  in  national  law…the  means  of  benefiting  from  that  exception  or 
limitation.” 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and  his  co‐authors  identify,  within  this  provision,  an  important  “normative  commitment  to 
ensuring  that  certain  public  interest  uses  can  be  made  of  technically  protected  works” 
(Reichman et al., 2007, p. 984). As an apparent attempt to maintain the balance of copyright in 
the  face  of  TPM protection,  Article  6(4)  seems premised  to  some degree  on  the  principle  of 
prescriptive parallelism (Reichman et al., 2007, p. 1042).40 However, as these authors and many 









in  such  a  way  that  members  of  the  public  may  access  them  from  a  place  and  at  a  time 
individually  chosen  by  them.”43  This  effectively  exempts  on‐demand  services  from  the 
obligation to safeguard user exceptions; rightholders who make their works available online on 
agreed contractual  terms (obviously an  important and growing digital distribution model) can 




to  the  protected work.”  Only  users  with  prior  lawful  access  to  the work  are  empowered  to 
exercise exceptions, but  there  is  apparently no obligation  for owners  to grant access  to  such 
users.  Consequently,  the  safeguard provision does not  appear  to  shield  lawful  uses  from  the 
effects of access‐control TPMs.  
 
Finally,  but  crucially,  Article  6(4)  applies  only  to  seven  specified  (and  seemingly  arbitrary) 
exceptions out of  the  twenty‐three permitted exceptions  listed  in Article 5 of  the Directive.45 
Notably  excluded  from  the  application  of  Article  6(4)  are  exceptions  for  parody  and  news 
reporting—both  activities  that  we  may  typically  associate  with  fair  use  rights,  and  both 
exceptions  that  are  widely  understood  to  reflect  a  concern  with  fundamental  freedoms  of 
speech and the press (Dusollier, 2003, p. 53). Indeed, even with regard to the seven exceptions 
that  are  listed,  Article  6(4)  operates  only  to  safeguard  the  benefit  of  exceptions  that  are 




While,  conceptually  speaking,  Article  6(4)  of  the  EU  Copyright  Directive was  both  novel  and 
laudable, its potential to achieve prescriptive parallelism has been significantly undermined by 
these  various  textual  and  practical  limitations.  To  the  extent  that  it  purports  to  protect  the 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public  values  embraced  by  copyright  limitations,  it  is  a  “toothless  tiger”  (Bechtold,  2004,  p. 
379).  Beneath  the  ostensible  promise  of  balance,  the  EU  copyright  regime  supports  private 
ordering by rightholders through the use of TPMs that restrict otherwise lawful uses of digital 
content.47    Predictably,  then,  national  implementations  of  the  EU  Copyright  Directive  have 
produced  a  wide  variety  of  different  approaches  to  the  problem  of  TPM  protection  and 







opting  instead  to  assume  that  voluntary  and market‐driven measures will  adequately  enable 
the exercise of existing exceptions, and empowering the Minister of Justice and a government 
department to report to Parliament recommending  legislative measures  if such proves not to 
be  the  case.  The  Czech  Republic  and  the  Netherlands  have  similarly  left  it  to  the  executive 
power to take appropriate measures to safeguard user exceptions only if and when necessary 
(Commission of the European Community, 2007; see also Gasser, 2006, p. 77). Other member 
states  (including  Finland,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Greece,  Lithuania,  Slovenia,  and  Hungary)  have 
opted  to  introduce  mediation  or  arbitration  proceedings  for  the  beneficiaries  of  exceptions 







Secretary  of  State,  acting  through  the  Patent  Office,  will  investigate  whether  any  voluntary 
measure or agreement exists  in relation to the work and,  in the absence of such, may issue a 
written  direction  requiring  the  copyright  owner  to  ensure  that  the  complainant  can  benefit 
from the permitted act. Failure to comply is an actionable breach of statutory duty.  
 
In  France,  the  slow  transposition  process  ultimately  saw  the  establishment,  in  2007,  of  an 
entirely  new  administrative  body,  the  Autorité  de  regulation  des  measures  techniques  de 
protection,  or  ARMTP.50  This  independent  regulatory  agency  represents  a  novel  governance 
structure specifically designed to address the challenges of TPMs in the  information economy 
(Winn and Jondet, 2009). In the absence of voluntary measures, cases may be submitted to the 





On  the  basis  of  this  brief  summary,  it  is  evident  that  the  Directive  has  failed  to  produce 
significant harmonization in this area, but also that it has thus far failed to achieve prescriptive 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parallelism  to  any  significant  degree.  Even  in  those  member  states  that  did  opt  to  enact 
legislative  safeguards  for  user  exceptions,  the  execution  of  the  exception  regime  is  typically 
cumbersome  and  impractical  for  the  would‐be  beneficiaries  (Wang,  2006,  p.  243;  citing 
Midgley, 2002). Where beneficiaries are empowered to seek  injunctive relief  from the courts, 
or even to initiate mediation, they are invited to embark upon a potentially costly, prolonged, 
and onerous  course of  action  that  is  unlikely  to make  sense  for  the  average user. Mediation 
solutions  reduce  the  exercise  of  permitted  acts  to  a  matter  for  negotiation  or  rightholder 
authorization not dissimilar to that required in respect of restricted acts (Dusollier, 2003, p. 73). 
Administrative solutions may be even more burdensome: in the United Kingdom, for example, 
rightholders  have  no  pre‐existing  obligation  to  facilitate  the  exercise  of  permitted  acts;  the 
Secretary of State has no obligation to order the rightholder to do so; the complainant has no 
right to appeal the Secretary’s decision; and failure to comply with an order merely establishes 
a  right  of  action,  making  the  pre‐requisite  complaint  process  little  more  than  an  additional 
administrative  hurdle  for  the  would‐be  beneficiary.  While  the  enforcement  powers  of  the 
French  ARMPTP,  together  with  the  right  to  appeal  its  decisions,  make  it  perhaps  the  most 
interesting initiative, the administrative burden imposed on users may nonetheless represent a 
significant barrier  to the exercise of permitted acts.  In the absence of efficient, effective, and 





Beyond  Europe,  New  Zealand  offers  an  interesting  example  of  a  novel  solution  to  the 
problematic  interaction  of  TPM‐protection  and  copyright  exceptions.    The  Copyright  (New 
Technologies)  Amendment  Act  2008  prohibits  the  distribution  of  circumvention  devices, 
services  and  information where  it  is  known  that  such will,  or  is  likely  to,  be used  to  infringe 
copyright (section 226A). Notably, the prohibitions do not extend to acts of circumvention per 
se, and nor do they protect pure access‐control TPMs. In addition to the careful circumscription 
of  anti‐circumvention  rights,  the  Act  includes  positive  measures  to  protect  beneficiaries  of 
copyright  exceptions.  First,  it  explicitly  states  that  the  rights  granted  to  the  issuer  of  a  TPM 
work  “do  not  prevent  or  restrict  the  exercise  of  a  permitted  act”  (section  226D(1))  and  that 
“[n]othing in this Act prevents any person from using a TPM circumvention device to exercise a 
permitted act” (section 226E(1)). Secondly, it introduces new provisions enabling a person who 






by New  Zealand  goes  some way  towards  ensuring  that  non‐infringing  activities  in  respect  of 
TPM‐protected works  are  not merely  permitted,  but  also  practicable.52  How  the  system will 
work in practice remains to be seen. 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for  protecting  TPMs,  the  practical  and  political  implications  of  TPM  protection,  and  the 
challenges  of  integrating  user  and  public  interest  exceptions  into  these  protective  schemes, 
become  increasingly  clear.  The  good  news,  however,  is  that  Canada  is  now  in  an  excellent 
position to benefit from the lessons that have been learned elsewhere, and to choose its path 
into the digital future with the benefit of other nations’ hindsight. In this section, I will provide a 
brief  overview of  the  two  “false  starts”  that  Canada has made  in  the  race  to  introduce  anti‐







In a  law reform process that began back  in 2001, Canadian Heritage and  Industry Canada are 
currently  formulating  what  will  be  the  third  iteration  of  proposed  anti‐circumvention 
legislation,  which  will  follow  on  the  heels  of  two  previous  Bills—and  two  starkly  different 
approaches  to  the  protection  of  TPMs.  Bill  C‐60,  which  represented  the  first  attempt  to 
introduce anti‐circumvention provisions, was developed under and swept aside with Canada’s 
Liberal  government.  Section  34.02(1)  of  Bill  C‐60  sought  to  establish  legal  protection  for 
TPMs53: 
34.02 (1) An owner of copyright in a work, a performer’s performance fixed in a 
sound  recording  or  a  sound  recording…are,  subject  to  this  Act,  entitled  to  all 
remedies…that are or may be  conferred by  law  for  the  infringement of a  right 
against  a  person  who,  without  the  consent  of  the  copyright  owner…, 
circumvents, removes or in any way renders ineffective a technological measure 
protecting any material  form of  the work,  the performer’s performance or  the 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to  tie  liability  for  the  provision  of  circumvention  services  to  actual  acts  of  copyright 




advantage of—the  limits and  flexibility of Article 11  to minimize  the potential  impact of anti‐
circumvention  laws beyond that of existing copyright norms. By  linking circumvention  liability 
to  copyright  infringement  liability,  it  proposed  an  additional  level  protection  for  rightholders 
without  substantially  widening  the  net  of  liability  to  catch  activities  that  would  have  been 
lawful  in  the  absence  of  these  additional  protections.  In  doing  so,  the  bill  was  apparently 
intended  to maintain  the  balance  between  owners  and  users  struck  by  traditional  copyright 
norms, and to avoid increasing the scope of rights connected to copyright ownership.  
 
Bill  C‐60  was  nonetheless  vulnerable  to  the  criticism  that  traditional  copyright  limits  and 
exceptions were not explicitly protected or positively safe‐guarded against the operation of the 
anti‐circumvention provisions, never mind  the operation of TPMs  themselves. To  the existing 
fears of copyright infringement suits and the curtailments effected by the proliferation of TPMs, 
Bill  C‐60 would have added  the  risk of  liability  for  TPM circumvention—a  further  threat with 
which to chill uses of protected content. Bill C‐60 did not offer to protect users and the public 
from  the  effects  of  TPMs  and  anti‐circumvention  liability  (Geist,  2005,  pp.  248‐9).56  In  this 
sense,  the  bill  offered  nothing  to  proactively  maintain  the  copyright  balance  against  the 
disruptive impact of the widespread use of TPMs.  
 





order paper when a  federal election was called  in September 2008,  it may be a harbinger of 
what  we  can  expect  in  any  future  copyright  reform  bill  brought  under  the  re‐instated 
Conservative  minority  government,  which  continues  to  proclaim  its  commitment  to  new 









TPMs.58  Whether  a  particular  technology  would  caught  by  this  prohibition  was  to  be 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to  these  exceptions—relating  to  law  enforcement  or  national  security  (section  41.11), 
computer  program  interoperability  (section  41.12),  encryption  research  (section  41.13),  the 
collection/communication  of  personal  information  (section  41.14),  the  security  of  computer 
systems/networks  (section  41.15),  persons  with  perceptual  disabilities  (section  41.16),  and 
ephemeral  recordings by broadcast undertakings  (section 41.17). Thus,  for example, a person 







The  Bill  sought  to  establish  the  power  for  the  Governor  in  Council  to  make  additional 
regulations to create further specific exceptions where technological measures “would unduly 
restrict  competition  in  the  aftermarket  sector  in  which  the  technological  measure  is  used” 
(section 41.2(1)). It envisaged the possibility of further regulations restricting liability for acts of 
circumvention (but, notably, not for liability relating to circumvention services or technologies) 
to  be  made  in  consideration  of  an  open  list  of  factors,  including:  whether  the  prohibition 
against  acts  of  circumvention  could  adversely  affect  authorized  uses;  whether  it  would 
adversely  affect  criticism,  review,  news  reporting,  commentary,  teaching,  scholarship  or 
research that could be made or done in respect of the work; whether it could adversely affect 
the market for the underlying work; and the work’s commercial availability (section 41.2(2)(a)). 
An  interesting  provision  contemplated  the  possibility  of  a  positive  claim  against  copyright 
owners, empowering the Governor in Council to make regulations requiring owners to provide 






infringement;  it  set  out  numerous  complex  exceptions  with  no  general  “fair  circumvention” 
exception;  it  neglected  even  to  offer  lip‐service  to  the  preservation  of  fair  dealing  rights 
comparable to statements found  in Article 6(4) of the E.U. Directive or section 1201(a) of the 
DMCA;  it offloaded the responsibility for carving out any more exceptions on the Governor  in 
Council,  without making  clear  on what  basis  such  exceptions would  be  regulated,  on whose 
request, and subject to what evidentiary burden;63 and it established no positive obligations for 
content providers,  leaving any  such obligations  to be created  through  regulation, and only  in 
respect  of  any  new  exceptions  made  under  this  regulatory  power.  It  is  also  significant  that 
“new” exceptions  that were  included  in  the bill—exceptions  for  format and  time shifting,  for 
example—were  made  subject  to  non‐circumvention  provisos  that  would  render  them 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Bills  C‐60  and  C‐61  thus  took  practically  polemic  approaches  to  the  enactment  of  anti‐
circumvention  provisions.  While  the  former  bill  would  have  established  a  new  level  of 
protection for copyright owners and thereby more than satisfied the requirements of the WIPO 
Treaties, it would have done so at relatively minimalist level, essentially duplicating the existing 
scope  (if  not  the basis) of  liability under existing  copyright norms.  In  contrast, Bill  C‐61 went 
significantly  beyond  the protections  required by  the  treaties. While C‐61  included  limitations 
not articulated in C‐60, these did not amount to a broad or principled restriction of the scope of 
anti‐circumvention  rights;  rather,  the  complexity  and  rigidity  of  these  narrowly  constructed 
exceptions  suggested only  a  grudging willingness  to make minimal  carve‐outs  to  far‐reaching 
prohibitions.  In this way, Bill C‐61 failed to reflect the centrality of  fair dealing and the public 
domain in copyright policy, treating them instead as marginal elements of the existing system 




In  choosing  its  approach  to  the  legal  regulation  of  TPMs,  Parliament  is  not  constitutionally 
bound to follow the conclusions of the Supreme Court or to pursue the goals of the copyright 
system  as  defined  by  the  Court—but  one  might  expect  that  Parliament  would  be  duly 
influenced by the reasoning of the highest court of the land, and would share its commitment 
to  achieving  a  balanced  copyright  system  (Murray,  2005,  p.  652).  As  Geist  explains,  “[b]y 
sending  a  clear  message  about  its  support  for  a  fair  copyright  balance  [in  Théberge],  the 
Supreme Court  has  indirectly  provided  the most  important  submission  on  the  current  digital 
copyright reform consultations” (Geist, 2002; cited in Kerr et al., 2002‐2003, p. 41). Since 2002, 
the  Court  has  reiterated,  expanded  on  and  applied  its  vision  of  balance—making  further 
indirect  contributions  to  a  consultation  process  that  continues  today.  And,  indeed,  the 
government claims to have been guided, in the copyright reform process, by the principle that 
“the  rights of  those who hold  copyright must be balanced with  the needs of users  to  access 










the digital  realm as  copyright has  traditionally maintained  in  the analogue world? The digital 
shift alters the practical and pragmatic considerations at play, but does  it alter the normative 
objectives of our copyright system, or the social values that  inform it? If we can agree on the 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calls  for  further  amendments  to  correct  these  new  regimes  add  credibility  to  the  claim  that 
such laws may still be premature and rife with unintended consequences. The United States has 
seen several attempts to amend the DMCA to better reflect the limits of control consistent with 
traditional  copyright  policy  and  the  Constitution.65  Recent  reports  in  Europe  have  identified 
serious  concerns  with  the  EU  Copyright  Directive  and  its  implementation  by member  states 
(Akester,  year;  Gowers,  2007;  Guibault  et  al.,  2007).  As  other  legislatures  come  under 
increasing  pressure  to  correct  perceived  mistakes  in  their  digital  copyright  laws,  Canadians 
should take some comfort in the possibility that inaction may yet be proved to have been the 
best  course  of  action.  In  Israel,  which,  like  Canada,  has  signed  but  not  ratified  the  WIPO 
Treaties, a  “wait‐and‐see” approach has apparently  found  favour;  recent amendments  to  the 
copyright  legislation  simply  did  not  include  the  introduction  of  anticipated  TPM  protection 
measures  (see deBeer,  2009,  p.  6;  Israel’s  Copyright Act  2007).    An official  statement  by  the 
Government of Israel explained this inaction with reference to the widespread criticism of TPMs 
and doubts as  to  their  continued commercial  relevance  (Government of  Israel, 2008;  cited  in 
deBeer, 2009, p. 7, note 22).   The Government of  Israel was correct to assert that, absent an 
international  obligation  to  enact  legal  protections  for  TPM,  other  nations  have  no  legitimate 




fair  and  lawful  uses  of  protected works  to  ensure  the  appropriate  balance  between  owners’ 
rights and the public  interest. The protection of TPMs may be unnecessary, but it may still be 
that the public needs legal protection from TPMs (Kerr et al., 2002‐2003, p. 79). In this sense, 






Particularly  in  light  of  the  costs  and  complexities  of  the  alternatives  canvassed  below,  this 
approach surely has much to recommend it. 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of  TPMs  subject  to  certain  formalities.  By  establishing  a  new  TPM  registry  at  the  Canadian 







If  Parliament  prefers  to  proceed  with  automatic  protection  for  TPMs,  the  original  bill  C‐60 
provides a decent example of what a minimalist approach might  look  like.  In application,  this 
approach would produce TPM protections that closely align with the existing rights of copyright 
owners,  essentially  reinforcing  copyright  proper  by  limiting  unlawful  circumvention  to  acts 
undertaken for purposes of copyright  infringement. Consistent with this minimalist approach, 
protection  would  be  afforded  only  to  use‐control  TPMs.  This  could  be  achieved  by  defining 
technical measures in terms of their ability to inhibit or prevent infringing acts, as was done in 





increase  the ease and efficiency with which  content providers  could prevent  circumventions, 
such technologies must be available  to  those who wish to access and use protected works  in 
non‐infringing  ways.  In  CCH,  the  Supreme  Court  denied  the  plaintiff  copyright  owners  the 
easiest route towards preventing a widespread, potentially infringing activity because the result 
would  have  been  to  shift  the  copyright  balance  too  far  in  favour  of  owners’  rights,  and  to 
interfere with “the proper use of copyrighted works for the good of society as a whole” (CCH, 
paragraph 41).  The  same considerations and commitment  to balance ought  to warn us away 
from  the  enactment  of  circumvention  device  prohibitions  as  a  shortcut  to  restrict 
circumvention activities. Where a distributor of circumvention technologies ought to be  liable 





prohibition,  which  would  not  unduly  impede  the  development  and  availability  of  dual‐use 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exceptions  contained  in  the  Copyright  Act.  Tying  circumvention  liability  to  copyright 
infringement  goes  part  way  to  achieving  this  goal  by  implicitly  permitting  the  lawful 
circumvention of TPMs for the purposes of  fair dealing and other permitted acts. However,  it 




but  also possible  in practice,  a  revised Copyright Act  should establish positive obligations  for 
rightholders  to  facilitate  fair and  lawful dealings with TPM‐protected works.70 This could  take 








unreasonable  to  expect  them  to  request  assistance  from  the  copyright  owner.  There  are 
various  options  at  this  stage,  none  of which  is,  admittedly,  ideal.  It may  not  be  sufficient  to 
permit  a  would‐be  user  to  initiate  a  legal  action  before  the  court,  or  to  instigate  formal 
arbitration or mediation proceedings, particularly if relief is limited to the specific party seeking 





be  simply  to  require  unencrypted  copies  of works  to  be  lodged  at  certain  public  institutions 
(libraries,  educational  institutions,  etc.)  either  on  request  or  by  legal mandate. Under  such  a 
scheme,  notice  requirements  on  protected  copies  could  indicate  the  sources  of  TPM‐free 
versions.73  Alternatively,  an  intermediary  could  be  entrusted  with  providing  circumvention 
services or devices on request, which would yield traceable copies of protected works.  In one 
version  of  this  model,  the  assigned  body  would  perform  a  gatekeeper  role  with  the 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independent  third  party  institution  would  be  responsible  for  providing  digital  keys  to 




charged  with  responsibility  for  obtaining  declarations  of  lawful  use  from  applicants,  and 




The  development  of  an  appropriate  lawful  use  infrastructure  is  a  complicated  proposition 
fraught with problems of both practicality and principle. Difficult questions would surround the 
identification of appropriate intermediaries or “qualified” persons or institutions to take on the 
“gatekeeper”  function.  To  encumber  existing  public  institutions  such  as  libraries,  archives  or 
educational establishments with this additional responsibility may not be appropriate or viable, 
particularly  if  the  intermediary  function  is  to  demand  some  degree  of  legal  and/or  technical 








result  in  a  “centralization  of  copyright  limitations  where  only  a  few  actors  determine  who 
benefits from such limitations, and for what purpose” (Bechtold, 2004, pp. 376). In addition, a 
system  that  requires  users  to  identify  themselves  and  their  intended  activities  in  order  to 
benefit  from  exceptions  inevitably  raises  significant  privacy  concerns  that  would  have  to  be 
overcome (Burk and Cohen, 2001, pp. 63‐5). Perhaps most fundamentally, however, it is all but 
impossible  to conceive of a  lawful use mechanism that does not have a chilling effect on  fair 
dealing  practices  by  increasing  user  transaction  costs  and  inhibiting  spontaneous  uses. 
Traditionally,  users  have  been  able  to  “use  now,  litigate  later”;  TPM  protection  offers  pre‐






continuous monitoring  of  its  application  and  effects  on  user  practices.  Procedures  should  be 
put  in  place  to  ensure  the  systematic  identification  and  assessment  of  the  impact  of  TPM 
protection (Gasser, 2006, pp. 104‐5). These should include, in addition to periodic and frequent 
administrative  review,  a  simple,  accessible  and  affordable  mechanism  for  members  of  the 
public to raise concerns about restrictions on lawful uses. Particularly if the anti‐circumvention 
regime operates with a system of enumerated narrow exemptions, it will be crucial to offer an 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being  both  encouraged  and  strengthened),  and  so  to  concede  a  role  for  digital  locks  in  our 






the perceived  threats posed by networked  technologies, with stronger entitlements  intended 
to  guarantee  a  foothold  for  existing  stakeholders  in  emergent markets  (Ganley,  year,  p.  55). 
Anti‐circumvention  laws  may  therefore  have  an  entrenchment  effect,  with  the  possible 
consequence  of  prematurely  foreclosing  the  emergence  of  new  industry  actors  and  the 
evolution  of  new models  or  avenues  of  dissemination.75 While  it  is  self‐evident  that  existing 
industry stakeholders would hope to achieve such entrenchment,  it  is by no means clear that 
policy‐makers  should  share  this  goal.  To  the  extent  that  policy‐makers  adopt  the  defensive 
posture of  rightholders  and established  industry  actors,  they  risk  circumscribing  the  creative, 
democratic and participatory opportunities that these technologies present for society at large.   
 
And  if  TPM  protection  appears  necessary  to  strengthen  the  control  offered  by  existing 
copyright  law,  we  should  consider  the  further  risk  that  the  creation  of  new  rights  will  only 
obfuscate the more fundamental failings of copyright in our networked society. Proponents of 
anti‐circumvention  legislation  frequently  point  to  massive  increase  and  pervasiveness  of 
copyright  infringing  activities  amongst  members  of  the  general  public  as  support  for  TPM 
protection. We must,  however,  take  care  not  to  bandage  over  wounds  that  are  in  need  of 
proper attention. The pervasiveness of end‐user infringements points to a growing disconnect 
between  social  norms  (old  and  emerging)  and  legal  norms  (traditional  and  proposed).  This 
increasingly chasmic divide suggests an even greater cause for concern: namely, the changing 
role and  relevance of  copyright  law  in everyday  cultural  exchange and creative play,  and  the 
way in which this challenges the normative foundations of the copyright system. Strengthening 
existing  laws  and  enacting  new  ones  is  potentially  a  quick  but  fleeting  fix  to  a  larger  socio‐
normative quandary. Where established and emerging user practices challenge the coherence 
of  social  and  legal  norms,  the  latter  become  increasingly  costly  and  difficult  to  enforce.  The 
imposition of  legal norms that are not sufficiently internalized by many or most citizens could 
threaten  the  perceived  legitimacy  of  the  copyright  system,  and  compromise  the  rule  of  law 
more generally (Gervais, 2005, pp. 48‐53).76 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the  established  rules  of  the  game.  Leaks,  limits  and  the  tough  practicalities  of  enforcement 
have always been an  important part of  the architecture of  the copyright system and the way 
that it achieved its so‐called balance. To the extent that TPMs are lauded as practical means by 
which  to  ameliorate  these  problems,  we  should  ask  whether  they  are  problems  that  need 
solving.  If  copyright were  to  operate  in  practice  in  perfect  harmony with  copyright  law  as  it 
exists on the book, the system would be far from perfect: because copyright as a system works 




the penumbra of doubt  that makes  them possibly  fair—and possibly  infringing  (see Gillepsie, 
2007, p. 59). Broad TPM protections will permit the indeterminacy of legal doctrine—which has 
been  so  central  to  the  preservation  of  breathing  space  for  fair  dealing  practices—to  be 
supplanted by the determinacy of technology.    
 
Although  better  control  does  not  necessarily  make  a  better  system,  the  quest  for  perfect 
control finds legitimation in the proprietary rhetoric of intellectual property. Thus, for example, 
protected content  is cast as private property, and the circumvention of TPMs is equated with 







risk  that added protection  for TPMs will  further entrench  the misleading proprietary  rhetoric 
that has pervaded the TPM debate, and lend weight to the perception of intellectual property 
as  absolute  dominion  (Ganley,  2006,  p.  56).  It  is  crucial  that  we  identify  and  challenge  the 
expansion (and frequent misapplication) of property rhetoric that has and will accompany new 





Canadian  policy  makers  continue  to  contemplate  the  appropriate  design  for  a  new  layer  of 
rights  that will afford greater protection to owners  in the digital environment.  In my opinion, 
the clearest route towards retaining roughly the same balance between copyright owners and 
users  in  this  new  environment  would  be,  first,  to  refrain  from  creating  anti‐circumvention 
rights, and second, to establish an effective system to facilitate lawful acts in relation to TPM‐
protected  works.  The  latter  would  require  the  enactment  of  a  positive  obligation  for 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rightholders  to  provide  the  necessary  means  for  users  to  take  advantage  of  recognized 
exceptions,  and  would  benefit  from  the  creation  of  an  intermediary  body  to  receive  user 






to  substantially  meet  the  principled  demands  of  prescriptive  parallelism  by  carefully 
constructing these rights around the existing corner‐stones of Canadian copyright policy. These 




accessible mechanisms  to  ensure  the  practical  availability  of  these  exceptions.  To  the  extent 
that such proposals sound unwieldy, this should be heard as a cautionary note not against the 
requirements and  limits described, but  rather against any  legislative  intervention to  reinforce 
TPMs through the copyright system.   
 
While an  ideal  solution  to  the  challenge of preserving  the  copyright balance  remains elusive, 
canvassing  these  possibilities  reveals  one  thing  with  certainty:  the  anti‐circumvention 
provisions of Bill C‐61 were far from an ideal solution. Canada’s copyright balance of rights and 
exceptions will be preserved in the digital environment only by resisting external pressures, by 
identifying  and  learning  from  best  and  worst  practices  in  other  jurisdictions,  and  most 















political  arguments  is  that,  through  a  combination  of  technical  pragmatism  and  misguided 
policy, we  fail  to  realize  the  full  benefits  and potential  (fulfill  the promise,  if  you will)  of  the 
digital  era.  In Robertson  v  Thomson  Corp.,79  Justice Abella  considered  copyright’s  capacity  to 
“keep  pace  with  technological  developments  to  foster  intellectual,  artistic  and  cultural 
creativity,”  and  stated  that,  when  considering  how  to  regulate  the  Internet  and  new 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more  than  just  consume  our  culture,  instead  enabling  them  to  actively  and  meaningfully 
participate in it.”81 Such statements seem to hold promise of a copyright system that respects 
and  reflects  the  transformative  possibilities  of  new  technologies  rather  than  resisting  and 
constraining  the emerging cultural practices  that  these  technologies permit.82 As we consider 
reforming  our  copyright  laws  in  response  to  the  digital  shift,  we  should  be  committed  to 
realizing this promise. 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1 This is an important conceptual distinction, if not always a practical one. As Kerr and his co-authors 
(2002-2003, p. 13) explain, in reality, TPMs often display use control and access control 
characteristics, making the distinction difficult to maintain, and complicating any effort to legislate 
activities in relation to one kind of TPM and not the other. 
2 Notably, the Canadian copyright balance, as articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Théberge 
v Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc. 2002 SCC 34 (Théberge), preserves, as an equal and 
distinct objective, providing a just reward for authors. I have argued elsewhere that the provision of 
individual reward can and should be subsumed within the general public goal of encouraging the 
creation and dissemination of intellectual works (see Craig, 2002), but such a conclusion is not 
necessary to support the argument advanced here.  
3 The teleological argument that underlies the demands for stronger legal rights is neatly articulated by 
James Boyle: “[T]he strength of intellectual property rights must vary inversely with the cost of 
copying,” from which it appears to follow that “as copying costs approach zero, intellectual property 
rights must approach perfect control” (2008, pp. 60-1). 
4 The Working Group reasoned: 
[L]egal protection alone will not be adequate to provide incentive to authors to create and to 
disseminate works to the public. Similarly, technological protection likely will not be effective 
unless the law also provides some protection for the technological processes and systems used to 
prevent or restrict unauthorized uses of copyrighted works. The Working Group finds that 
prohibition of devices, products, components and services that defeat technological methods of 
preventing unauthorized use is in the public interest and furthers the Constitutional purpose of 
copyright laws (White Paper, 1995, p. 230, emphasis added). 
5 WIPO treaties (1996) [online]. Available at 
<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html> and 
<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/trtdocs_wo034.html> [Accessed on October 2009]. 
6  A striking example is the elimination of a draft article that would have recognized a right of 
copyright owners to control temporary reproductions of their work in a computer’s RAM. 
7 For a detailed account of the US agenda at WIPO and its impact on the resulting treaties, see 
Samuelson (1997). With regard to the regulation of circumvention technologies specifically, see 
Litman (2001, pp. 129-33). 
8 Article 18 of the WPPT, supra note 5, reads: 
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against 
the circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by performers or producers 
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of phonograms in connection with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty and that restrict 
acts, in respect of their performances or phonograms, which are not authorized by the performers 
or the producers of phonograms concerned or permitted by law. 
9 Samuelson argues that US law would have satisfied Article 11 obligations without the enactment of 
the Digital Millenium Copyright Act.  
10 This interpretation of the text of Article 11 is not without its critics. As Kerr and his co-authors 
(2002-2003) acknowledge, the article could be read to mean that protected TPMs include those 
which restrict acts in relation to works that are not authorized by authors (i.e. as well as those 
restricting acts that are not permitted by law) (p. 36).   
11 Howard Knopf (2008) Canada, WIPO, and certain “obligations” [online]. Available at 
<http://excesscopyright.blogspot.com/2008/02/canada-wipo-and-certian-obligations.html> 
[Accessed on October 2009].  Knopf cites in support  J. Craig Barker: 
The effect of signature is not, as one might expect, to bind a state to the terms of a treaty.… A 
state that has signed, but not yet ratified, a treaty is bound not to do anything contrary to the 
objects and purposes of that treaty prior to ratification or withdrawal of signature. However, a 
state is not bound to follow the terms of a treaty in their entirety until ratification (2002). 
12 The text continues: “the ratification process would only be considered after further work has been 
completed.”  See Government of Canada (2008a). 
13 Not everyone is a critic of such a development, however. See, e.g. Bell (1998). 
14 See Ginsburg (2001):  
The ‘copyright balance’ is hardly immutable… It is far from apparent why the ‘balance’ in force 
from the advent of [mass market copying] devices should be more normative and less contingent 
that the prior ‘balance,’ or than the now emerging balance (p. 5).Notably, Ginsburg does not present 
the access-right as a wholly new creation of the digital era, but rather suggests that it was arguably 
“implicit in the reproduction and distribution rights under copyright in the days before mass copying 
devices. The copyright owner controlled access by choosing how to make the work available.” See 
also Olswang (1995); Heide (2001).    
15 For further discussion, see infra.  
16 2004 SCC 13, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, (CCH, cited to S.C.R.). 
17 I should note that fair dealing is best understood as part of the public domain, and has been 
recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada as such. In Théberge, supra note 2, Justice Binnie 
opined that the exceptions to copyright infringement enumerated in the Copyright Act “seek to 
protect the public domain in traditional ways such as fair dealing for the purpose of criticism or 
review and to add new protections to reflect new technology, such as limited computer program 
reproduction and ‘ephemeral recordings’ in connection with live performances” (paragraph 32).  
18 Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42 [online]. Available at <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/C-42/> 
[Accessed on October 2009]. 
19 There are therefore three hurdles to be met by a defendant who claims to have dealt fairly with a 
work: first, the purpose must be one of those listed in the Act; second, the dealing must be fair; and 
finally, sufficient acknowledgement must have been given where statutorily required. 
20 “[T]he purpose of copyright law was to balance the public interest in promoting the encouragement 
and dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator” 
(CCH, supra note 16, paragraph 23). 
21 The Court allowed the defendant Library to claim a “research” purpose in the provision of copying 
services to its patrons. In recognition of the public purposes of the Copyright Act, the Court opined 
that a more inclusive approach to applying the fair dealing defence was necessary. 
22 In order to be fair, a dealing must be for the purpose of research, private study, news reporting, 
criticism or review; and it must be “fair”, which is “a question of fact and depends on the facts of 
each case” (CCH, supra note 16, paragraph 52). Although there is no “set test,” determinations of 
fairness involve consideration of several factors, which may include (1) the purpose of the dealing; 
(2) the character of the dealing; (3) the amount of the dealing; (4) alternatives to the dealing; (5) the 
nature of the work; and (6) the effect of the dealing on the work (ibid., paragraph 53).  
23 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub.L. No. 105-304, Title I, 112 Sta. 2860 (1998), codified at 17 
U.S.C. §1201(a)-(b) (1999) (DMCA) [online]. Available at 
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<http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf> [Accessed on October 2009]. Litman (2001) 
comments:  
Copyright owners who want to ensure that they control—and can charge money for—any 
appearance of their works in any computer anywhere…were able to persuade Congress to pass 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which encourages the use of technological protections to 
facilitate a pay-per-view, pay-per-use system…” (p. 27). 
24 Ultimately, in recognition of all that is currently unknown and unforeseeable, Kerr and colleagues’ 
report advised against the implementation of any new legal measures in Canada to protect TPMs for 
the time being. 
25 Kerr and co-authors (2002-2003) note that that legal protection for TPMs is inherently contrary to 
the principle of media or technology neutrality. 
26 See Apple Inc. (2009) Changes Coming to the iTunes Store [online]. Available at 
<http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2009/01/06itunes.html> [Accessed on October 2009]. 
27 In its Copyright Reform “Backgrounder,” the Government of Canada (2008b) states:  
The Internet has threatened the ability of rights holders to prevent the unauthorized use of works 
and other protected subject matter. People around the world have taken advantage of the Internet 
to access content that is available in user-friendly forms. This access is often made through new 
legitimate services and platforms, and also via free alternatives, both legitimate and illegitimate, 
to the traditional channels of distribution of copyright material. 
See also Barry B. Sookman (2005): “TPM’s are essential to limiting the ease of carrying out 
copyright infringement in the digital environment. Without adequate legal protection and effective 
legal remedies against the circumvention of TPMs, [the] goals [of Canadian copyright policy] will 
be undermined” (p. 26). 
28 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson (1999):  
Clinton Administration officials, bowing to the wishes of Hollywood and its allies, opted…to 
support an unpredictable, overborad, and maximalist set of anti-circumvention regulations…. It 
was, in short, not the needs of the digital economy that drove adoption of the anti-circumvention 
provisions in the DMCA. Rather, what drove the debate was high rhetoric, exaggerated claims, 
and power politics from representatives of certain established but frightened copyright industries 
(p. 533).   
29 While 1201(a)(2) prohibits trafficking in devices that circumvent access controls, 1201(b) prohibits 
trafficking in circumvention devices designed or produced to circumvent TPMs that protect the 
exclusive rights of copyright holders in the Copyright Act (e.g. those measures that copyright 
owners employ to prevent unauthorized reproduction of the work).  
30 Samuelson (1999) argues that “the enumerated exceptions in the act-of-circumvention ban are 
unduly narrow and inconsistent with framework principles” (pp. 537-46). 
31 The list also includes: circumvention to achieve interoperability of computer programs (§1201(f)); 
circumvention to prevent minors from accessing material on the Internet (§1201(h)); circumvention 
when either the technical measure or the work collect of disseminate personally identifying 
information about the user’s online activities (§1201(i)); circumvention to test the security of a 
computer, computer system, or network (§1201(j)). Note that only three of these exceptions apply to 
one or both of the anti-device rules: the exception for reverse engineering may, subject to 
limitations, permit a person to develop and make available the means of circumventing both access- 
and rights-control TPMs to achieve interoperability; encryption research and security testing 
exceptions are, subject to limitations, available for the development and distribution of devices 
necessary to circumvent access-control measures only.  
32 For example, an exemption exists for “[c]omputer programs in the form of firmware that enable 
wireless telephone handsets to connect to a wireless telephone communication network, when 
circumvention is accomplished for the sole purpose of lawfully connecting to a wireless telephone 
communication network.” All six exemptions can be found online.  Available at 
<http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/index.html> [Accessed on November 2009].  The fourth 
anti-circumvention rulemaking proceeding (2009) is in progress at the time of this writing. 
33 Herman and Gandy (2006) provide a fascinating account of the emergence and implementation of 
this procedure, criticizing the scheme for “taking the responsibility for ensuring fair use away from 
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the courts and giving it to an obscure, relatively toothless rulemaking process,” and “leaving wider 
fair use concerns without a venue” (p. 188).  
34 For a number of illustrative examples of restrictions imposed by the DMCA, see Kerr et al. (2002-
2003, pp. 69-74).  A full list of DMCA cases that have presented fair use, free speech and privacy 
concerns can be found online.  Available at <http://www.eff.org/issues/dmca> [Accessed on 
November 2009].  
35 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (SDNY 2000). 
36 Sub. nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v Eric Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2nd Cir. 2001) (Corley). 
37 Ibid., p. 429. 
38 71 Fed. Reg. 68472, 68473 (November 27, 2006). 
39 Directive 2001/29/EC on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in 
the Information Society, art.6 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 (Copyright Directive) [online].  Available at < 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:167:0010:0019:EN:PDF > 
[Accessed on October 2009]. In accordance with Article 6(3), the protection encompasses the act of 
circumvention and trafficking in devices and services both in relation to copyright control measures 
and access control measures.  
40 Reichman et al. identify article 6(4) as “one dimension of parallelism in the EU Directive.” 
Riechman cites Hugenholtz (2000): “[Article 6(4)] is presumably intended to reconcile the interests 
of right owners employing technical protection measures with the interests of users wishing to 
benefit from copyright limitations” (p. 501) 
41 “‘Fair use by mandate’ describes circumstances in which rightholders are directed to enable non-
infringing uses but not necessarily given specific instructions as to how that should be done” (Besek, 
2004, p. 492). 
42 See Dusollier (2003): “Would any measure, even a minimal one, free the State from its legislative 
duty to safeguard the public interest? If it did, too much unrestrained power would go to authors and 
other rights holder of copyrighted works” (p. 53).  
43 Article 6(4), Copyright Directive, supra note 39.  
44 The intended scope of this carve-out is not entirely clear. For example, does an online music store 
qualify as an interactive on-demand service? See Gasser and Girsberger (2004, p. 25) and Brown 
and Bohm (2003) (describing this as “a dramatic reduction of copyright users’ rights that needs 
urgent revision in the review of the Directive” [p. 21]); and Dusollier (2003, p. 54). 
45 Included are exceptions concerning: specific reproductive acts by libraries, educational 
establishments, museums or archives without commercial advantage; certain acts in respect of 
ephemeral recordings; reproductions of broadcasts by social institutions for non-commercial 
purposes; certain illustrative uses in teaching or scientific research; certain uses for the benefit of 
persons with a disability; and certain uses for the purpose of public security. On the apparently 
arbitrary nature of this selection, see: Institute for Information Law, 2007, p. 110; cited in Reichman 
et al., 2007, at note 312; see also Dusollier, 2003, p. 53.  
46 See also Reichman et al. (2007): “[T]he failure to mandate the adoption of a wide range of 
exceptions undermines the effectiveness of Article 6(4) in achieving its general goal of prescriptive 
parallelism” (p. 1043). 
47 Compare to Dusollier (2004): “Behind a balanced, publicly oriented exterior…lies a private-
orderings model in which author interests are privileged and preserved” (p. 55). See also Weise 
(2002): 
[T]he Directive permits a scenario where there is virtually nothing left of the traditional 
copyright balance: a world where fair use rights are dead since most circumvention acts and all 
circumvention devices are prohibited; a world where copyright law would be replaced by 
technological monopolies and electronic contracts (p. 151).  
48 Section 374(3) of the Irish Copyright and Related Rights Act states that beneficiaries of exceptions 
“may apply to the High Court for an order requiring a person to do or to refrain from doing anything 
the doing or refraining from doing of which is necessary to ensure compliance with the provisions of 
this section” (cited in Gasser, 2004, p. 79).  The Act is available online at  
<http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2000/en/act/pub/0028/index.html > [Accessed on November 2009]. 
Section 95b(2) of the German Law for the Regulation of Copyright in the Information Society 
similarly provides right to claim from rightholders the necessary means to benefit from exceptions. 
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Available at <http://www.urheberrecht.org/topic/Info-RiLi/ent/Bundesrat_Drucksache_271_03.pdf> 
[Accessed on November 2009]. Section 71 quinquies(2) of Luxemburg’s revised Law on Copyright, 
Neighbouring Rights and Databases entitles beneficiaries to take injunction proceedings. Available 
at <http://www.wipo.int/clea/en/text_pdf.jsp?lang=FR&id=2933> [Accessed on November 2009].   
49 Added to the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 by the Copyright and Related Rights 
Regulations 2003, 2003, S.I. 2003/2498 (U.K.). For further information see Shah (2004).  
50 Created by the Loi sur le Droit d’Auteur et les Droits Voisins dans la Société de l’Information 
(DADVSI).  The body consists of six members appointed for a six year term after designation by 
their respective bodies: see Decree of 4 April 2008 concerning the Regulatory Authority on 
technical protective devices created by Article L. 331-17 of the Intellectual Property Code, 
published in the Journal Officiel of 5 April 2008; see also Berbinau (2007) and Blocman (2007). 
51 Pursuant to subsection 226E(2)(b), the user may engage a qualified person to exercise the permitted 
act on his or her behalf only if the copyright owner or the exclusive licensee has refused the user’s 
request for assistance or has failed to respond to it within a reasonable time. 
52 In its original enactment of anti-circumvention laws, Australia also included means by which lawful 
users could obtain circumvention devices or services from “qualified persons” to enable or facilitate 
permitted uses: Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 No. 110, 2000 (Cth), section 
116A(3). However, following the coming into force of the Australia-United States Free Trade 
Agreement 2005 [AUSFTA], available at <www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/us_fta/final-text/> 
[Accessed on November 2009], Australia has enacted revised anti-circumvention provisions that 
more closely align with the approach taken in the DMCA. Revised Copyright Act 1968 available at 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca1968133.txt> [Accessed on November 2009]. 
See also, Weatherall (2004-05). 
53 Technological measures were defined in the bill as “any technology, device or component that, in the 
ordinary course of its operation, restricts the doing… of any act that is mentioned in section 3, 15, or 
18 or that could constitute an infringement of any applicable moral rights.” In other words, a 
protected TPM is one that ordinarily restricts infringing activities. Bill C-60, An Act to Amend the 
Copyright Act, section 1(2) [online]. Available at 
<http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?pub=bill&doc=c-
60&parl=38&ses=1&language=E> [Accessed on November 2009]. 
54 Subsection 80(1) provides that, subject to certain limitations, it does not infringe copyright to make 
an audio-recording of a musical work for private use. As such, s. 32.02 of the bill did extend 
circumvention liability beyond existing copyright liability with regard to private copies of sound 
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55 Geist asks whether, for example, distributing software that is frequently used for infringing purposes 
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242). 
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2007 (H.R. 1201).   
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provisions on a set of positive steps taken by rightholders. 
67 New Zealand’s Copyright (New Technologies) Amendment Act 2008, Section 226, includes in its 
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69 For further discussion, see infra. 
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71 Section 95b(1) of the German Copyright Act (UrhG), added by the Law for the Regulation of 
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Abella in the context of a minority judgment. The majority appeared less concerned with ensuring 
that copyright not interfere with the advantages offered by new technologies: “Media neutrality is 
not a licence to override the rights of authors — it exists to protect the rights of authors and others as 






Akester, P. (2009) ‘Technological Accommodation of Conflicts between Freedom of 
Expression and DRM: The First Empirical Assessment’ [online]. Available at 
<http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/faculty-resources/download/technological-
accommodation-of-conflicts-between-freedom-of-expression-and-drm-the-first-
empirical-assessment/6286/pdf> [Accessed on October 2009].  
Barker, J.C. (2002) ‘Mechanisms to Create and Support Treaties, Conventions and other 
Responses’ UNESCO Encyclopaedia of Life-Support Systems, EoLss Publishers, Paris 
[online]. Available at <http://www.eolss.net/EolssSampleChapters/C14/E1-44-
01/E1-44-01-TXT-02.aspx> [Accessed on October 2009]. 
Bechtold, S. (2004) ‘Digital Rights Management in the United States and Europe’, American 
Journal of Comparative Law, 52, 323-382. 
Bell, T.W. (1998) ‘Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on 
Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine’, North Carolina Law Review, 76, 557-620. 
Berbinau, J. (2007) ‘Copyright in Cyberspace: Towards a Workable Balance: Setting up a 
Regulatory Authority’, [online]. Available at 
<http://www.armt.fr/IMG/doc/IPO2007.doc> [Accessed on October 2009]. 
Besek, J.M. (2004) ‘Anti-Circumvention Laws and Copyright: A Report from the Kernochan 
Center for Law, Media and the Arts’, Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts, 27, 385-517. 
Blocman, A. (2007)  ‘Setting up of the Regulatory Authority on Technical Protection 
Measures’, IRIS 2007-5:9/13 [online]. Available at 
This is the pre-peer reviewed version of this article, which is published in final form in the  
Journal of World Intellectual Property (2010) at: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/120125414/issue 
 
40                                                       CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES                                [VOL. 06 NO. 05 
 
                                                                                                                                            
<http://merlin.obs.coe.int/iris/2007/5/article13.en.html> [Accessed on October 
2009]. 
Boyle, J. (2008) The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind. Yale University Press, 
New Haven, CT. 
Brown, I. and Bohm, N. (2003) Implementing the EU Copyright Directive. Foundation for 
Information Policy Research [online].  Available at 
<http://www.fipr.org/copyright/guide/eucd-guide.pdf> [Accessed on October 2009]. 
Burk, D.L. and Cohen, J.E. (2001) ‘Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems’, 
Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, 15, 41-83. 
Commission of the European Communities (2007) Report to the Council, the European Parliament 
and the Economic and Social Committee on the application of Directive 2001/29/EC on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, Commission 
Staff Working Document, SEC(2007) 1556, 30/11/2007 [online]. Available at 
<http://www.ipex.eu/ipex/webdav/site/myjahiasite/groups/CentralSupport/public/2
007/SEC_2007_1556/COM_SEC(2007)1556_EN.doc> [Accessed on October 2009]. 
Craig, C. (2002) ‘Locke, Labour and Limiting the Author’s Right: A Warning Against a 
Lockean Approach to Copyright Law’, Queen’s Law Journal, 28, 1-60. 
Craig, C. (2005) ‘The Changing Face of Fair Dealing in Canadian Copyright Law: A Proposal 
for Legislative Reform’, in M. Geist (ed.), In the Public Interest: The Future of Canadian 
Copyright Law, Irwin Law, Toronto, pp. 437-461. 
deBeer, J. and Geist, M. (2008) ‘Developing Canada’s IP Agenda’, in J. Daudelin and Daniel 
Schwanen (eds), Canada Among Nations 2007: What Room for Manoeuvre? McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, Montréal, pp. 157-180. 
deBeer, J. (2009) Copyright and Innovation in the Networked Information Economy, Working Paper 
[online]. Available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1410158> [Accessed on October 
2009]. 
Drassinower, A. (2005) ‘Taking User Rights Seriously’, in M. Geist (ed.), In the Public Interest: 
The Future of Canadian Copyright Law, Irwin Law, Toronto, pp. 462-479. 
Dusollier, S. (2003) ‘Fair Use by Design in the European Copyright Directive of 2001’, 
Communications of the ACM, 46(4), 51-55. 
Ganley, P. (2004) ‘Digital Copyright and the New Creative Dynamics’, International Journal of 
Literature of Law & Information Technology, 12(3), 282-332 . 
Gasser, U. and Girsberger, M. (2004) Transposing the Copyright Directive: Legal Protection of 
Technological Measures in EU-Member States, A Genie Stuck in a Bottle?, Berkman Publication 
Series, No. 2004-10 (November) [online]. Available at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=628007> [Accessed on October 
2009]. 
Gasser, U. (2006) ‘Legal Frameworks and Technological Protection of Digital Content: 
Moving Forward towards a Best Practice Model’, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & 
Entertainment Law Journal, 17(Fall), 39-113. 
Geist, M. (2002) ‘Key Case Restores Copyright Balance’, The Globe and Mail, 18 April 2002, 
page B16. 
Geist, M. (2005) ‘Anti-circumvention Legislation and Competition Policy: Defining a 
Canadian Way?’, in M. Geist (ed.), In the Public Interest: The Future of Canadian Copyright 
Law. Irwin Law, Toronto, pp.211-250. 
This is the pre-peer reviewed version of this article, which is published in final form in the  
Journal of World Intellectual Property (2010) at: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/120125414/issue 
 
2010]                    DIGITAL LOCKS AND THE FATE OF FAIR DEALING IN CANADA                    41 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Geist, M. (2006) Our Own Creative Land: Cultural Monopoly & The Trouble With Copyright. Hart 
House Lecture Committee, University of Toronto, 30 March. 
Gervais, D. (2005) ‘The Price of Social Norms: Towards a Liability Regime for File-Sharing’, 
12 Journal of Intellectual Property Law, 12(1), 39-74 [online]. Available at 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=525083> [Accessed October 2009]. 
Gillepsie, T. (2007) Wired Shut: Copyright and the Shape of Digital Culture. The MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Ginsburg, J.C. (1999) ‘Copyright Legislation for the ‘Digital Millenium’’, Columbia Journal of 
Law & the Arts, 23(2), 137- . 
Ginsburg, J.C. (2001) ‘From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: the Development of an 
Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law’, in H. Hansen (ed.), U.S. Intellectual Property Law and 
Policy. Edward Elgar, Northampton, MA, pp. [online]. Available at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?ABSTRACT_ID=222493> [Accessed on October 
2009]. 
Government of Canada (2008a) Canada's Bill C-61: Questions and Answers [online]. Available at 
<http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/crp-prda.nsf/eng/h_rp01153.html> [Accessed on 
October 2009]. 
Government of Canada (2008b) Reforming the Copyright Act – Backgrounder [online]. Available 
at <http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/crp-prda.nsf/eng/h_rp01151.html> [Accessed on 
October 2009]. 
Government of Canada (2008c) Speech from the Throne 2008: Protecting Canada’s Future [online]. 
Available at <http://www.sft-ddt.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1383> [Accessed on 
October 2009]. 
Heide, T. (2001) ‘Copyright in the EU and U.S.: What Access Right?’, Journal of the Copyright 
Society of the USA, 48(3), 363- [online]. Available at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=270861> [Accessed on October 
2009]. 
Herman, B.D. and Gandy, Jr., O.H. (2006) ‘Catch 1201: A Legislative History and Content 
Analysis of the DMCA Exemption Proceedings’, Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law 
Journal, 24, 121-190. 
Herman, B.H. (2008) ‘Breaking and Entering My Own Computer: The Contest of Copyright 
Metaphors’, Communication Law & Policy, 13(2), 231-274 . 
HM Treasury (2006) Gowers Review of Intellectual Property [online]. Available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/links/gowers_report_en.pdf> 
[Accessed on November 2009] 
Hohfeld, W.N. (1946) Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning. Yale 
University Press, New Haven, CT. 
Hugenholtz, P.B. (2000) ‘Why the Copyright Directive is Unimportant, and Possibly Invalid, 
European Intellectual Property Review, 22(11), 501-502. 
Institute for Information Law (2007) Study on the Implementation and Effect in Member States’ 
Laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related 
Rights in the Information Society, Final Report, [online]. Available at 
http://www.ivir.nl/publications/guibault/Infosoc_report_2007.pdf [Accessed on 
October 2009]. 
Kerr, I.R., Maurushat, A. And Tacit, C.S. (2002-2003) ‘Technical Protection Measures: 
Tilting at Copyright’s Windmill’, Ottawa Law Review, 34(1), 7-82. 
This is the pre-peer reviewed version of this article, which is published in final form in the  
Journal of World Intellectual Property (2010) at: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/120125414/issue 
 
42                                                       CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES                                [VOL. 06 NO. 05 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Kerr, I.R. (2005) ‘If Left to Their Own Devices: How DRM and Anti-circumvention Laws 
Can Be Used to Hack Privacy’, in M. Geist (ed.), In the Public Interest: The Future of 
Canadian Copyright Law, Irwin Law, Toronto, pp. 167-210. 
Koelman, K.J. (2000a) ‘A Hard Nut to Crack: The Protection of Technological Measures’, 
European Intellectual Property Review, 22(6), 272-288. 
Koelman, K. and Helberger, N. (2000b) ‘Protection of Technological Measures’, in P. Bernt 
Hugenholtz (ed.), Copyright and Electronic Commerce: Legal Aspects of Electronic Copyright 
Management. Kluwer Law International, The Hague, pp. 165-227.  
Litman, J. (1990) ‘The Public Domain’, Emory Law Journal, 39(Fall), 965-1023. 
Litman, J. (2001) Digital Copyright. Prometheus Books, New York. 
Michael Geist (2008) 61 Reforms to C-61, Day 40: TPMs - No Regular Review Process [online]. 
Available at <http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/3297/99999/> [Accessed on 
October 2009]. 
Midgley, J. (2002) ‘Critique of the Proposed UK Implementation of the EU Copyright 
Directive.’ Available at 
<http://www.cfdr.eu.org/issues/eucd/ukimpl/critique_uk_impl.pdf> [Accessed on 
November 2009].  
Murray, L. (2005a) ‘Bill C-60 and Copyright in Canada: opportunities Lost and Found’, 
Canadian Journal of Communication, 30(4), 649-654. 
Murray, L. (2005b) ‘Copyright Talk: Patterns and Pitfalls in Canadian Policy Discourses’, in 
M. Geist (ed.), In the Public Interest: The Future of Canadian Copyright Law, Irwin Law, 
Toronto, pp. 15-40. 
Murray, L.J. and Trosow, S.E. (2007) Canadian Copyright: A Citizen’s Guide. Between the Lines 
Press, Toronto. 
Nimmer, D. (2000) ‘A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’, University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, 148(January), 673-742. 
Olswang, S. (1995) ‘Accessright: An Evolutionary Path for Copyright into the Digital Era?’, 
European Intellectual Property Review, 17(5), 215-218. 
Reichman, J.H., Dinwoodie, G.B. and Samuelson, P. (2007) ‘A Reverse Notice and 
Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted 
Works’,  Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 22, 981-1060. 
Samuelson, P. (1996) ‘Regulating Technologies to Protect Copyrighted Works’, 
Communications of the ACM, 39(7), 17-22. 
Samuelson, P. (1997) ‘The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO’, Virginia Journal of International Law, 
37, 369-439. 
Samuelson, P. (1999) ‘Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-
Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised’, Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 14, 519-
566.  
Samuelson, P. (2003) ‘Mapping the Digital Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities’, Law 
and Contemporary Problems, 66(Winter/Spring), 147-171.  
Secor, G. (1997) ‘Fair Use in a Pay-Per-Use World’, Practice & Theory, 21(1), 53-59. 
Shah, A. (2004) ‘UK’s Implementation of the Anti-Circumvention Provisions of the EU 
Copyright Direction: An Analysis’, Duke Law & Technology Review, 3(January) [online].  
Available at < http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2004dltr0003.html> 
[Accessed on November 2009].  
This is the pre-peer reviewed version of this article, which is published in final form in the  
Journal of World Intellectual Property (2010) at: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/120125414/issue 
 
2010]                    DIGITAL LOCKS AND THE FATE OF FAIR DEALING IN CANADA                    43 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Sookman, B.B. (2005) ‘“TPMs”: A Perfect Storm for Consumers: Replies to Professor 
Geist’, Canadian Journal of Law & Technology, 4(1), 23-43. 
The State of Israel – Ministry of Justice (2009) 2009 Intellectual Property Law Submission of the 
Government of Israel to the United States Free Trade Representative with Respect to the 2009 
“Special 301 Review” [online]. Available at 
<http://www.justice.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/BD753811-E87A-4AB2-8ADD-
DC9423DFC794/13684/2009special301submission.pdf> [Accessed on October 2009]. 
Wang, R.L. (2006) ‘DMCA Anti-Circumvention Provisions in a Different Light: Perspectives 
from Transnational Observation of Five Jurisdictions’ AIPLA Quarterly Journal, 
34(Spring), 217-250.  
Weatherall, K. (2004-05) ‘Locked In: Australia Gets a Bad Intellectual Property Deal’, Policy: 
a journal of public policy and ideas, 20(4), 18-24. 
White Paper:  Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure (1995) The 
Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights [online].  Available at 
<http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/ipnii.pdf> [Accessed on 
October 2009].  
Wiese, H. (2002) ‘Anti-circumvention Laws: A ‘Circumvention’ of the Copyright Balance in 
the Digital Age?’, Tolley’s Communications Law, 7(5), 146-154 .  
Winn, J.K. and Jondet, N.A. (2009) ‘A ‘New Deal’ for End Users? Lessons from a French 
Innovation in the Regulation of Interoperability’, William & Mary Law Review, 51(2), 
forthcoming [online]. Available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1419750> [Accessed on 
October 2009]. 
 
This is the pre-peer reviewed version of this article, which is published in final form in the  
Journal of World Intellectual Property (2010) at: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/120125414/issue 
 
